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know more about farm financial conditions than at anytime since the crisis began. However, little consensus
exists among farmers, policymakers or academics about agriculture's capacity to adjust to financial stress, or
the type of public intervention that would be appropriate if existing institutions and markets need to be
assisted in making this transition.
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The financial crisis in agriculture has been a reality for some farm 
families since early 1980. As with any industry-wide upheaval, it was 
slow developing. And its origins can be traced back at least a decade. 
Today we know more about farm financial conditions than at anytime since 
the crisis began. However, little concensus exists among farmers, 
policymakers or academics about agriculture's capacity to adjust to 
financial stress, or the type of public intervention that would be 
appropriate if existing institutions and markets need to be assisted tn 
making this transition. 
This paper will be largely descriptive. Hopefully, it will lead to 
a more fruitful assessment of the policy papers that will be presented 
later in the conference. 
U.S. Farm Financial Conditions - 1985 
The current farm financial problems appear, at first glance, to be 
widespread and fairly uniform among farm families. This is not the case. 
Some farmers are earning acceptable incomes and rates of return. Others 
are failing utterly. These differences make public financial policy 
difficult to design and even more difficult to administer. 
Another characteristic that makes the farm financial problem 
difficult is that it possesses both human and financial dimensions. Farm 
financial stress is a human problem. It affects a definable group within 
the farm population. As with any crisis, financial stress causes 
suffering and pain. There is a financial side as well. Financial and 
farm asset markets are not performing well. Many institutions ranging 
from county seat banks and grain elevators to the Farm Credit System seem 
to be in jeopardy. Although the human side of this crisis gets some play 
1n the press, it is the financial dimension that receives the attention 
of policymakers. 
Incidence and Relative Frequency of Financial Stress 
Measuring financial stress is not straightforward. In the 
short-run, a negative cash flow can indicate stress. It may also reflect 
expansion or a routine buildup in grain or livestock inventories. The 
debt-to-asset (D/A) ratio has been widely used as a measure of stress. 
Normally the D/A ratio measures solvency. However, it can also be used 
as a rough measure of liquidity. With rates of return to owned assets 
currently averaging 6 to 7 percent and debt service costs (principal and 
interest) averaging 15 to 16 percent, farmers with aD/A ratio exceeding 
40 percent would be expected to have negative cash flows. 
Insolvency is the extreme measure of stress. 
exceed the value of its assets, in most cases, it 
operation. However, the insolvency rate is not a 
of financial problems. 
When a farm's debts 
will fail and cease 
good leading indicator 
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Table 1 gives the proportioa of farms occurring 1n these three 
stress categories for the U.S. and ten regions. These estimates are 
based on data from the USDA's Farm Costs and Retura Survey (FCRS). These 
data reflect Jaauary 1985 coaditions. 
Slightly more than 50 perceat of U.S. farm operators in 1984 
failed to generate a pos1t1ve cash flow. Ia other words, farm 
and aoafarm iacome could aot meet all cash obligatioas iacludiag 
debt service. 
Over 18 perceat of farmers ia the U.S. had D/A ratios over 
40 perceat. Nearly 3 perceat were iasolveat. 
Financially stressed farmers were most common 1n the Lake States, 
Corn Belt aad Northera Plaias. For the most part this reflects 
the distribution of farm operations in the United States. 
In relative terms, a greater proportion of farm operators were 
exper1eac1ng cash flow problems ia the Northeast aad the Delta. 
Farmers with high D/A ratios, including insolvent operations, 
were relatively more common in the Corn Belt, Northern Plains and 
the Delta. 
Appalachia, Southern Plains and Mountain States showed average or 
above average proportions of farmers with cash flow problems. 
However, insolvency and high D/A ratios seem significantly less 
than in the Midwest. 
One commonly held belief is that farm debt problems primarily affect 
large high-rolling operations or midsized, inefficient farms. Table 2 
reports the frequency of financial stress by annual sales class 
categories. 
The size composition of the farm populatioa defiaed 
is given in the column headed Total Farms. Over 60 
the population has annual sales less than $40,000. 
corn production, this would be a farm less thaa 120 
by the FCRS 
percent of 
In terms of 
acres. 
The frequency of financial stress follows the farm size 
distribution closely. The most common farm size with cash flow 
or solvency problems is a small part-time operation. 
In relative terms some differeaces between small and large farms 
are evident. Small farms tend to experience relatively more cash 
flow problems. Larger farmers, on the other hand, show 
proportionally a much greater frequency of high leverage and 
insolvency. 
Severity of Financial Stress 
The severity of financial stress in the United States cannot be 
directly inferred from Tables l aad 2. A farm firm's earaed equity 
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growth rate (EGR) can provide an approximate measure of the severity of 
financial stress. The equity growth rate, in this analysis, is 
calculated by dividing the firm's value of earned equity growth by its 
current net worth. The dollar growth in earned equity is- equal to net 
cash farm income plus off-farm income less family living expendit~res. 
If positive, this money is available to reduce principal, replace capital 
equipment, expand, or as a risk reserve. If negative, the shortfall is 
either added to debt or discharged by the lender. In this ratio form, 
the magnitude of the equity gain or loss is expressed relative to the 
size of the farm's net worth. 
In Table 3 five EGR ranges are defined. Farms with an EGR less than 
-20 percent are losing over 20 percent of their equity from earn>ngs 
alone. With declining asset values, farms in this category are extremely 
vulnerable to financial failure. Insolvent firms are also included in 
this category. Farms with an EGR from -20 to -5 percent are likely 
experiencing serious financial difficulties. Interest is continuing to 
accumulate and principal payments are being made. Farms with an EGR from 
-5 to +5 percent are in limbo. They cannot replace equipment or meet all 
principal repayment requirements. With an EGR from +5 to +20 percent the 
farm business is showing reasonable progress. Equity may still fall due 
to declining asset values. However, the farm's earnings are 
satisfactory. A farm with an EGR exceeding 20 percent would, at first 
glance, seem exceptional. This high EGR may be due to a very high 
earnings on assets. However, it may also be due to a small positive 
income combined with an even smaller net worth. 
The distribution of farm operators -- their 
the five EGR cat'egories -- >S given in Table 3. 
to be indicated: 
debt and assets among 
Several key results need 
For the U.S. 15 percent of the farm operators are insolvent or 
have an EGR less than 20 percent. These farmers control nearly 
28 percent of U.S. farm operator debt and 8.8 percent of farm 
assets. In general this group will be unlikely to survive. 
At the other extreme, 15.5 percent of farm operators had an EGR 
exceeding 20 percent in 1984. This group controls 14.7 percent 
of the debt and 10 percent of the assets. 
Combining firms with an EGR less than 5 percent, 60.9 percent of 
the operators controlling 64.1 percent of the debt are likely to 
experience financial stress and need to make operating changes to 
remain viable. 
In relative terms, the Corn Belt and Lake States show fewer 
farmers in the -20 percent EGR groups and more in the +20 percent 
groups. 
In the Delta, Southern Plains and Southeast more operators are 
experiencing severe financial stress compared with the national 
average. Further these farmers owe 30 percent of the regional 
farm debt. 
The Pacific States show a very high concentration of debt, 
35 percent, held by relatively few severely-stressed farm 
operators. 
In Table 4, we look at the severity of financial stress as a 
function of farm size. 
The largest farm sizes have the greatest proportion of both high 
income and high stress farms. 
Farmers with annual sales under $100,000, show relatively few 
high EGR farms. The concentration of debt in stressed operations 
is greater than average for these small farms as well. 
Financial stress affects all size categories. In terms of the 
sector, more debt and assets and fewer operators are in the 
larger sales category. 
Characteristics of Farm Operators 
The FCRS data set contains relatively little demographic data on 
farm operators. Table 5 reports characteristics of Iowa farm families by 
D/A class. These data were collected in early 1985. 
The low debt Iowa farmers tend to be older, operate smaller 
acreages and have fewer dependents. 
Education level does not seem to be greatly affected by D/A 
class. 
The largest farms in terms of assets and acreage are in the 40 to 
70 percent D/A group. 
The distribution of farm operators, their debt and assets among 
D/A groups parallels the national data. Iowa farmers with D/A 
ratios over 40 percent control over 70 percent of the operator 
debt. 
The rapidly falling asset values have dramatically changed the 
financial condition of Iowa farmers in just a year's time. Table 6 gives 
the percentage change between 1984 and 1985 in the balance sheet for 
farmers within a given D/A group. 
The sample average showed a loss in asset value of 17.7 percent 
-- roughly equal to the decline in land values. Debt levels 
increased slightly, but non-real estate debt increased and real 
estate debt declined. Overall, equity fell nearly 25 percent 1n 
one year. 
Farmers in the 40-70 percent D/A group experienced moderate to 
severe stress. Changes in their average balance sheet followed 
the sample average. However, equity fell 34.5 percent. 
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The high-debt farm operators in the 70-100 D/A group lost over 
88 percent of their equity in one year. This occurred despite 
their attempts to reduce debt. Falling asset values and partial 
liquidation were the likely culprits. 
Farms that were insolvent in January 1984 increased non-real 
estate debt during the year. Asset values declined. Net worth, 
already negative, fell an additional 62 percent. 
Farm-Level Adjustments to Financial Stress 
Data presented in this report suggest that up to two-thirds of the 
farm debt in the United States is held by farm businesses experiencing 
financial stress. This is clearly an unstable situation. In the 
short-run, farms may adjust by attempting to increase productivity, by 
reducing costs or by reducing principal repayment. In the longer run, 
farm operations will need to adjust enterprises and in many cases 
restructure assets and liabilities. Financial restructuring involves 
selling assets, reducing debts and, in some situations, renegotiating 
principal balances with lenders. The restructuring process takes time. 
For some farm businesses, the adjustment is relatively minor. For 
others, so much of the asset base must be sold that the firm will likely 
fail before the restructuring cari be accomplished. 
Restructuring requirements for financially stressed farm businesses 
were estimated from Iowa Farm Finance Survey data. The average farm in 
40-70 and 70-100 D/A group was restructured using three common 
techniques. A scale-back assumes the farmer sells assets, retires debt 
and reduces the size of the business. A sale-leaseback assumes assets 
and associated liabilities are liquidated, but the assets could be leased 
from an investor at prevailing rates. Debt discharge assumes the lender 
writes off sufficient debt to produce a positive cash flow. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7 for three 
income levels. At current income levels, the average 40-70 percent D/A 
producer shows a negative cash flow of $-11,400. Using a scale-back, a 
positive cash flow could be produced by selling 28.6 percent of the 
firm's owned assets. Over 44 percent of the debt would be reduced. A 
sale-leaseback reduces the extent of liquidation required to 
21.5 percent. If the lender would discharge 20 percent of the debt 
about $72,000 (Table 5), the business would have a positive cash flow. 
The results in Table 7 suggest: 
For moderate debt operations and current income levels, 
liquidation requirements are extensive but generally feasible. 
Changes in income levels have a significant impact on the extent 
and feasibility of restructuring for this moderate debt group. 
Debt discharge, in general, offers only a partial solution to 
restructuring problems. 
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For high-debt farms, in the 70-100 percent D/A group, all 
restructuring options seem nearly infeasible. The prospect of 
liquidating 70 to 80 percent of a farm's asset base with a 
lease-back seems fortuitous at best. Farmers in this group, in 
general, are living on borrowed time. 
Final Comments 
Currently only a third of the farmers in the U.S. are experiencing 
serious financial problems. Unfortunately, this group also owes most of 
the money. Financial restructuring offers the primary long-term solution 
to this debt crisis. However, it will take time-- perhaps up to an 
additional five years. Further, there is real doubt as to the capacity 
of agricultural asset markets to accommodate this massive adjustment. Up 
to 15 to 20 percent of farm assets may be liquidated as farmers and 
lenders attempt to adjust to current economic conditions. This compares 
to the historical 2-4 percent moved volume. Improved incomes, lessen, 
but do not eliminate the need for extensive restructuring. Lower farm 
incomes would be a disaster. The key financial policy issue is how to 
buy sufficient time. to make the transition without incurring unacceptable 
economic and human costs along the way. 
Table 1. Incidence and Relative Frequency of Financially Stressed 
Farm Operations by Region 
Region 
1/ 
Total-
Negative 3/ 
Cash Flow 
D/A Ratio 
Over 40 Percent Insolvent 
Northeast 7.2 4.5 J:.! 62.8!:_/ 
Lake States 12.7 6.0 47.3 
Corn Belt 21.3 9.9 46.4 
Northern Plains 10.7 5.3 49.1 
Appalachia 13.7 6.6 48.0 
Southeast 6.0 2.9 48.3 
Delta 5.4 3.5 64.4 
Southern Plains 12.0 6.1 51.2 
Mountain 5.4 2.9 53.4 
Pacific 5.7 2.7 47.5 
United States 100.0 50.3 
~/Percent of U.S. farms. 
~/Percent of farms in region. 
~Net cash income from farming plus off-farm 
expenditures and principal payment. 
1.0 J:.! 14.~/ 0.2 ~/ 3.oY 
3.3 25.6 0.4 3.3 
5.3 24.7 0.8 3.9 
2.9 26.7 0.4 4.0 
1.3 9.5 0 .l 0.9 
0.8 13.2 0.2 3.0 
1.0 17.7 0.2 4.1 
1.3 11.2 0.3 2.1 
1.2 22.0 0.1 2.4 
1.0 16.6 0.2 3.2 
19.0 3.0 
~ncome less estimated family living 
Source: 1984 Farm Costs and Returns Survey, USDA. 
Table 2. Incidence and Relative Frequency of Financially Stressed Farm 
Operations by Sales Class 
Annual Total 1/ Negative 3/ D/A Ratio 
Sales Farms Cash Flow- Over 40% Insolvent 
($1000) 
500 + l.a.!! 0.7!:./ 38.93.1 o.1~Y 38.93.1 o.iY 6.03.1 
250-499 4.1 1.5 36.6 1.6 39.0 0.2 5.8 
100-249 l3 .6 5.4 39.7 4.5 33.1 0.6 4.7 
40-99 18.1 8.6 47.5 5.0 27.6 0.8 4.4 
10-39 23.3 l3 .4 57.5 3.8 16.3 0.8 3.4 
Less than 10 39.2 20.6 52.6 3.4 8.7 0.4 1.0 
United States 100.0 50.3 19.0 3.0 
~/Percent of U.S. farms. 
3./Percent of farms in region. 
2/Net cash income from farming plus off-farm >ncome less estimated family 
living expenditures and principal payment. 
Source: 1984 Farm Costs and Returns Survey, USDA. 
Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Farm Operators, Their Debts and 
Assets by Equity Growth Rate and Region 
Equity Growth 
(percent) 
Rate 
Insolvent 
or Less 
Region -20 -20 to -5 -5 to +5 +5 to +20 Over +20 
Northeast 
Operators 16.5 23.9 31.2 17.6 11.0 
Debt 26.8 16.7 21.7 19.9 14.7 
Assets 7.4 19.9 43.2 10.0 9.5 
Lake State 
Operators 12.7 15.9 28.7 28.1 14.8 
Debt 23.1 12.6 23.5 30.6 10.0 
Assets 8.5 12.4 33.4 37.3 8.3 
Corn Belt 
Operators 14.2 15.3 26.0 25.2 19.2 
Debt 28.1 11.4 20.0 20.5 20.0 
Assets 9.9 12.4 33.8 30.2 13.9 
Northern Plains 
Operators 17.5 13.7 28.9 25.8 13.9 
Debt 24.2 17.7 23.6 21.1 13.4 
Assets 9.7 13.4 37.9 30.8 8.3 
Appalachia 
Operators 14.4 18.8 26.6 23.9 16.3 
Debt 16.9 11.1 22.9 25.6 23.5 
Assets 5. 7 13.8 40.1 27.4 13.1 
Southeast 
Operators 15.9 19.9 24.9 23.4 15.7 
Debt 37.6 15.9 15.7 16. l 14.5 
Assets 9.5 15. 1 43.1 20.1 12.5 
Delta 
Operators 19.0 24.6 27.1 15. 1 14.2 
Debt 32.6 18.6 25.1 9.5 14.2 
Assets 9.1 18.3 33.5 15.2 8.1 
Southern Plains 
Operators 17.4 19.0 27.3 21.1 15 .1 
Debt 35.1 19.5 l7 .8 15.5 12.2 
Assets 9.1 16.9 47.0 18.8 8.3 
Mountain 
Operators 14.0 13.6 39.1 20.5 12.7 
Debt 24.6 15.2 29.6 18.6 11.8 
Assets 8.2 11.8 53.4 20.4 6.3 
Pacific 
Operators 10.7 17.2 31.0 27.1 14.2 
Debt 35.1 11.5 20.8 20.4 12.2 
Assets 8.4 12.9 44.5 25.2 8.8 
United States 
Operators 15.1 l7 .5 28.3 23.6 15.5 
Debt 27.6 14.3 22.2 21.2 14.7 
Assets 8.8 14.3 40.8 26.2 10 .0 
Source: 1984 Farm Costs and Returns Survey, USDA. 
Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Farm Operators, Their Debts and 
Assets by Equity Growth Rate and Sales Class 
Equity Growth Rate 
(percent) 
Insolvent 
Sales Size or Less 
Class -20 -20 to -5 -5 to +5 +5 to +20 Over +20 
( $1000) 
500 + 
Operators 16. 1 8.9 18.9 23.3 32.8 
Debt 32.6 7. 5 18.2 21.2 20.4 
Assets 13.1 12.8 28.7 27.4 17.9 
250-499 
Operators 13.7 6.5 17.8 27.0 23.5 
Debt 22.4 9.9 23.2 26.6 17.9 
Assets 9.5 8.1 35.9 32.7 13.7 
100-249 
Operators 13.0 10.2 23.0 33.3 20.5 
Debt 22.8 15.5 22.6 25.5 13.6 
Assets 7 .8 11.3 37.8 32.8 10.3 
40-99 
Operators 15.3 14.0 32.2 25.5 12.9 
Debt 31.5 20.0 25.3 14.5 8.7 
Assets 9.5 15.0 47.5 22.6 5.4 
Less than 40 
Operators 15.4 21.0 29.0 20.5 13.9 
Debt 31.9 17.0 20.8 15.6 14.6 
Assets 7.3 20.0 45.1 20.5 8.2 
United States 
Operators 15. 1 17.5 28.3 23.6 15.5 
Debt 27.6 14.3 22.2 21.2 14.7 
Assets 8.8 14.3 40.8 26.2 10 .0 
Source: 1984 Farm Costs and Returns Survey, USDA. 
Table 5. Average 1985 Financial Condition of Sample Iowa Farm Operators 
By 1985 Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio (%) 
Financial Characteristics 0-10 10-40 40-70 70-100 100+ All 
Assets ($1000) 
Non-Real Estate 136 166 236 156 85 166 
Real Estate 282 375 420 348 152 340 
Total 418 541 656 504 237 506 
Debts ($1000) 
Non-Real Estate 6 44 121 143 190 60 
Real Estate 4 82 238 251 124 101 
Total 10 126 359 394 314 161 
Net Worth ($1000) 408 415 297 110 -77 345 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio ' ·;) 2.4 23.3 54.7 78.2 132.5 31.8 
Operator Characteristics 
Age 59 54 48 46 45 54 
Years 1n Farming 35 29 25 23 22 29 
Dependents 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.0 
Dependents <18 Years 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.7 
Husband Educatio~/ 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 
. f d . l/ W1 e E ucat1on- 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Acres Owned 235 280 295 271 159 261 
Acres Rented 114 172 285 302 326 193 
Acres Operated 327 430 562 539 484 433 
Off-Farm Income $7738 $5795 $6621 $5574 $9426 $6779 
Percentage Distribution 
% Operators 35 32 21 7 4 100 
% Assets 29 34 28 7 2 100 
% Debts 2 25 48 17 8 100 
~/Educational attainment, highest level attended 
1 = grade school, 2 = high school, 3 = college or vocational 
Source: 1985 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
Table 6. Percentage Change 1n Financial Condition, 1984-1985 
Iowa Farm Operators 
-------1984 Debt-to-Asset Ratio------
Average 40-70 70-100 100+ 
Assets 
Non-Real Estate - 8.8 - 6.9 -16.5 1.4 
Real Estate -21.5 -20.6 -31.4 -32.4 
Total -17.7 -16.1 -26.2 -21.2 
Debts 
Non-Real Estate l3 .2 7.0 - 2.4 11.8 
Real Estate - 1.9 - 1.6 -16.9 -32.7 
Total 3.2 1.3 -10.4 - 6.9 
Net Worth -24.8 -34.5 -88.4 -62.2 
Source: 1985 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
Table 7. Average Percent Asset and Debt Liquidation 
Required to Service Remaining Debt 
Iowa Farm Operators 
----------------- Debt-to-Asset Ratio ----------------
40-70 70-100 
Income Leve 1...!:/ Low Current Low Current 
Net Cash Flow ($1000) -20.0 -ll.4 -2.9 -37.4 -30.5 -23.7 
Restructuring Option 
(Percentage Change) 
Scaleback 
Asset 
Debt 
Sale-Leaseback 
Asset 
Debt 
Debt Discharge 
Debt 
43.0 
66.6 
35.5 
55.0 
35 .6 
28.6 
44.3 
2l.5 
33.3 
20.3 
Source: Jolly and Doye, FAPRI Staff Report #8. 
8.7 
l3 .5 
5.8 
9.0 
5.2 
NF 
NF 
86.3 
94.1 
59.3 
NF 
NF 
74.8 
8l.5 
48.4 
!/current income- 7.5 percent cash return on assets; low income- 6.5 percent 
cash return or assets; high income- 8.5 percent cash return on assets. The 
recovery rate on liquidated assets is assumed to be 85 percent. 
NF 
::IF 
6l.8 
67.4 
37.6 
